persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe
themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according
to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in
something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which
they envisage into its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not
every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream-image, and that the
further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the
faculty of opinion.
So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty
by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by
disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in
sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the
facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to
them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty
of the soul be identical with, or different from, the faculty of
sense-perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without
our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even to see
wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears
something real, though not exactly what he supposes. But we have
assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears, nor exercises any
sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees
nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception is
unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other
senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of
these affections, as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in
a certain manner to his [primary] faculty of sense, though not in
precisely the same manner as when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion
says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object
seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited, and becomes a
mere follower of the phantasm.
It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name 'dreaming',
is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an