On Generation and corruption   

On the contrary, this is where the whole error lies. For unqualified

coming-to-be and passing-away are not effected by 'association' and

'dissociation'. They take place when a thing changes, from this to

that, as a whole. But the philosophers we are criticizing suppose that

all such change is 'alteration': whereas in fact there is a

difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor

corresponding to the definition and there is a material factor.

When, then, the change is in these constitutive factors, there will be

coming-to-be or passing-away: but when it is in the thing's qualities,

i.e. a change of the thing per accidents, there will be 'alteration'.

'Dissociation' and 'association' affect the thing's susceptibility

to passing-away. For if water has first been 'dissociated' into

smallish drops, air comes-to-be out of it more quickly: while, if

drops of water have first been 'associated', air comes-to-be more

slowly. Our doctrine will become clearer in the sequel.' Meantime,

so much may be taken as established-viz. that coming-to-be cannot be

'association', at least not the kind of 'association' some

philosophers assert it to be.



3



Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must

first consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and

passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be

in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something

and out of something-I mean, e.g. comes-to-be-healthy out of being-ill

and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being big and

big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance. For if

there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, 'something'

must-without qualification-'come-to-be out of not-being', so that it

would be true to say that 'not-being is an attribute of some

things'. For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified