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On Generation and corruption   
(i) if all of them are uniform in substance, what is it that separated
one from another? Or why, when they come into contact, do they not
coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches
drop (for the two cases are precisely parallel)? On the other hand
(ii) if they fall into differing sets, how are these characterized? It
is clear, too, that these, rather than the 'figures', ought to be
postulated as 'original reals', i.e. causes from which the phenomena
result. Moreover, if they differed in substance, they would both act
and suffer action on coming into reciprocal contact.
V. Again, what is it which sets them moving? For if their 'mover' is
other than themselves, they are such as to 'suffer action'. If, on the
other hand, each of them sets itself in motion, either (a) it will
be divisible ('imparting motion' qua this, 'being moved' qua that), or
(b) contrary properties will attach to it in the same respect-i.e.
'matter' will be identical in-potentiality as well as
numerically-identical.
As to the thinkers who explain modification of property through
the movement facilitated by the pores, if this is supposed to occur
notwithstanding the fact that the pores are filled, their postulate of
pores is superfluous. For if the whole body suffers action under these
conditions, it would suffer action in the same way even if it had no
pores but were just its own continuous self. Moreover, how can their
account of 'vision through a medium' be correct? It is impossible
for (the visual ray) to penetrate the transparent bodies at their
'contacts'; and impossible for it to pass through their pores if every
pore be full. For how will that differ from having no pores at all?
The body will be uniformly 'full' throughout. But, further, even if
these passages, though they must contain bodies, are 'void', the
same consequence will follow once more. And if they are 'too minute to
admit any body', it is absurd to suppose there is a 'minute' void
and yet to deny the existence of a 'big' one (no matter how small
the 'big' may be), or to imagine 'the void' means anything else than a
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