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On Sophistical Refutations   


refutation, but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of what

refutation is.

The clearest cases of all, however, are those that were previously

described' as depending upon the definition of a 'refutation': and

this is also why they were called by that name. For the appearance

of a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition,

and if we divide fallacies in the above manner, we ought to set

'Defective definition' as a common mark upon them all.

Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon

stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be

cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the

conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so', and this

does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it

should come about without taking into account the original point,

and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon

begging the original point.

Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon

stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be

cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the

conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so', and this

does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it

should come about without taking into account the original point,

and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon

begging the original point.

Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident:

for the consequent is an accident, only it differs from the accident

in this, that you may secure an admission of the accident in the

case of one thing only (e.g. the identity of a yellow thing and

honey and of a white thing and swan), whereas the consequent always

involves more than one thing: for we claim that things that are the

same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another, and

this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent. It is,

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