On Sophistical Refutations   

however, not always true, e.g. suppose that and B are the same as C

per accidens; for both 'snow' and the 'swan' are the same as something

white'. Or again, as in Melissus' argument, a man assumes that to

'have been generated' and to 'have a beginning' are the same thing, or

to 'become equal' and to 'assume the same magnitude'. For because what

has been generated has a beginning, he claims also that what has a

beginning has been generated, and argues as though both what has

been generated and what is finite were the same because each has a

beginning. Likewise also in the case of things that are made equal

he assumes that if things that assume one and the same magnitude

become equal, then also things that become equal assume one magnitude:

i.e. he assumes the consequent. Inasmuch, then, as a refutation

depending on accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is,

clearly so also does a refutation depending on the consequent. We

shall have further to examine this in another way as well.

Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions

into one consist in our failure to dissect the definition of

'proposition'. For a proposition is a single statement about a

single thing. For the same definition applies to 'one single thing

only' and to the 'thing', simply, e.g. to 'man' and to 'one single man

only' and likewise also in other cases. If, then, a 'single

proposition' be one which claims a single thing of a single thing, a

'proposition', simply, will also be the putting of a question of

that kind. Now since a proof starts from propositions and refutation

is a proof, refutation, too, will start from propositions. If, then, a

proposition is a single statement about a single thing, it is

obvious that this fallacy too consists in ignorance of what a

refutation is: for in it what is not a proposition appears to be

one. If, then, the answerer has returned an answer as though to a

single question, there will be a refutation; while if he has

returned one not really but apparently, there will be an apparent

refutation of his thesis. All the types of fallacy, then, fall under