On Sophistical Refutations   

as much by means of the object itself); secondly a man is liable to be

deceived, even when inquiring by himself, when he takes speech as

the basis of his inquiry: moreover the deception arises out of the

likeness (of two different things), and the likeness arises out of the

language. With those fallacies that depend upon Accident, deception

comes about because we cannot distinguish the sameness and otherness

of terms, i.e. their unity and multiplicity, or what kinds of

predicate have all the same accidents as their subject. Likewise

also with those that depend on the Consequent: for the consequent is a

branch of Accident. Moreover, in many cases appearances point to

this-and the claim is made that if is inseparable from B, so also is B

from With those that depend upon an imperfection in the definition

of a refutation, and with those that depend upon the difference

between a qualified and an absolute statement, the deception

consists in the smallness of the difference involved; for we treat the

limitation to the particular thing or respect or manner or time as

adding nothing to the meaning, and so grant the statement universally.

Likewise also in the case of those that assume the original point, and

those of false cause, and all that treat a number of questions as one:

for in all of them the deception lies in the smallness of the

difference: for our failure to be quite exact in our definition of

'premiss' and of 'proof' is due to the aforesaid reason.



8



Since we know on how many points apparent syllogisms depend, we know

also on how many sophistical syllogisms and refutations may depend. By

a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism

or refutation which appears to be valid but is not, but also one

which, though it is valid, only appears to be appropriate to the thing

in question. These are those which fail to refute and prove people

to be ignorant according to the nature of the thing in question, which