|
|
On Sophistical Refutations 
matter of that, the false refutations likewise belong to the number of
the infinite: for according to every art there is false proof, e.g.
according to geometry there is false geometrical proof, and
according to medicine there is false medical proof. By 'according to
the art', I mean 'according to the principles of it'. Clearly, then,
it is not of all refutations, but only of those that depend upon
dialectic that we need to grasp the common-place rules: for these
stand in a common relation to every art and faculty. And as regards
the refutation that is according to one or other of the particular
sciences it is the task of that particular scientist to examine
whether it is merely apparent without being real, and, if it be
real, what is the reason for it: whereas it is the business of
dialecticians so to examine the refutation that proceeds from the
common first principles that fall under no particular special study.
For if we grasp the startingpoints of the accepted proofs on any
subject whatever we grasp those of the refutations current on that
subject. For a refutation is the proof of the contradictory of a given
thesis, so that either one or two proofs of the contradictory
constitute a refutation. We grasp, then, the number of
considerations on which all such depend: if, however, we grasp this,
we also grasp their solutions as well; for the objections to these are
the solutions of them. We also grasp the number of considerations on
which those refutations depend, that are merely apparent-apparent, I
mean, not to everybody, but to people of a certain stamp; for it is an
indefinite task if one is to inquire how many are the considerations
that make them apparent to the man in the street. Accordingly it is
clear that the dialectician's business is to be able to grasp on how
many considerations depends the formation, through the common first
principles, of a refutation that is either real or apparent, i.e.
either dialectical or apparently dialectical, or suitable for an
examination.
|
