On Sophistical Refutations   

(touto) is a common form of several inflections: for 'this' signifies

sometimes 'he' (outos) and sometimes 'him' (touton). It should

signify them alternately; when combined with 'is' (esti) it should be

'he', while with 'being' it should be 'him': e.g. 'Coriscus

(Kopiskos) is', but 'being Coriscus' (Kopiskon). It happens in the

same way in the case of feminine nouns as well, and in the case of the

so-called 'chattels' that have feminine or masculine designations. For

only those names which end in o and n, have the designation proper

to a chattel, e.g. xulon ('log'), schoinion ('rope'); those which do

not end so have that of a masculine or feminine object, though some of

them we apply to chattels: e.g. askos ('wineskin') is a masculine

noun, and kline ('bed') a feminine. For this reason in cases of this

kind as well there will be a difference of the same sort between a

construction with 'is' (esti) or with 'being' (to einai). Also,

Solecism resembles in a certain way those refutations which are said

to depend on the like expression of unlike things. For, just as

there we come upon a material solecism, so here we come upon a verbal:

for 'man' is both a 'matter' for expression and also a 'word': and

so is white'.

It is clear, then, that for solecisms we must try to construct our

argument out of the aforesaid inflections.

These, then, are the types of contentious arguments, and the

subdivisions of those types, and the methods for conducting them

aforesaid. But it makes no little difference if the materials for

putting the question be arranged in a certain manner with a view to

concealment, as in the case of dialectics. Following then upon what we

have said, this must be discussed first.



15



With a view then to refutation, one resource is length-for it is

difficult to keep several things in view at once; and to secure length