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On Sophistical Refutations   

of 'this object's'. Nor again if 'He is what you call him by name',

while 'the name you call him by is Cleon's', is he therefore

'Cleon's': for he is not 'Cleon's', for what was said was that 'He,

not his, is what I call him by name'. For the question, if put in

the latter way, would not even be Greek. 'Do you know this?' 'Yes.'

'But this is he: therefore you know he'. No: rather 'this' has not the

same meaning in 'Do you know this?' as in 'This is a stone'; in the

first it stands for an accusative, in the second for a nominative

case. 'When you have understanding of anything, do you understand it?'

'Yes.' 'But you have understanding of a stone: therefore you

understand of a stone.' No: the one phrase is in the genitive, 'of a

stone', while the other is in the accusative, 'a stone': and what

was granted was that 'you understand that, not of that, of which you

have understanding', so that you understand not 'of a stone', but 'the


Thus that arguments of this kind do not prove solecism but merely

appear to do so, and both why they so appear and how you should meet

them, is clear from what has been said.


We must also observe that of all the arguments aforesaid it is

easier with some to see why and where the reasoning leads the hearer

astray, while with others it is more difficult, though often they

are the same arguments as the former. For we must call an argument the

same if it depends upon the same point; but the same argument is apt

to be thought by some to depend on diction, by others on accident, and

by others on something else, because each of them, when worked with

different terms, is not so clear as it was. Accordingly, just as in

fallacies that depend on ambiguity, which are generally thought to

be the silliest form of fallacy, some are clear even to the man in the

street (for humorous phrases nearly all depend on diction; e.g. 'The

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