Physics   

different from both.
Further, the typical locomotions of the elementary natural
bodies-namely, fire, earth, and the like-show not only that place is
something, but also that it exerts a certain influence. Each is
carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the one up, the other
down. Now these are regions or kinds of place-up and down and the rest
of the six directions. Nor do such distinctions (up and down and right
and left, &c.) hold only in relation to us. To us they are not always
the same but change with the direction in which we are turned: that is
why the same thing may be both right and left, up and down, before and
behind. But in nature each is distinct, taken apart by itself. It is
not every chance direction which is 'up', but where fire and what is
light are carried; similarly, too, 'down' is not any chance direction
but where what has weight and what is made of earth are carried-the
implication being that these places do not differ merely in relative
position, but also as possessing distinct potencies. This is made
plain also by the objects studied by mathematics. Though they have no
real place, they nevertheless, in respect of their position relatively
to us, have a right and left as attributes ascribed to them only in
consequence of their relative position, not having by nature these
various characteristics. Again, the theory that the void exists
involves the existence of place: for one would define void as place
bereft of body.
These considerations then would lead us to suppose that place is
something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in
place. Hesiod too might be held to have given a correct account of it
when he made chaos first. At least he says:
'First of all things came chaos to being, then broad-breasted earth,'
implying that things need to have space first, because he thought,
with most people, that everything is somewhere and in place. If this
is its nature, the potency of place must be a marvellous thing, and
take precedence of all other things. For that without which nothing
else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be
first; for place does not pass out of existence when the things in it
are annihilated.
True, but even if we suppose its existence settled, the question of
its nature presents difficulty-whether it is some sort of 'bulk' of
body or some entity other than that, for we must first determine its
genus.
(1) Now it has three dimensions, length, breadth, depth, the
dimensions by which all body also is bounded. But the place cannot be
body; for if it were there would be two bodies in the same place.
(2) Further, if body has a place and space, clearly so too have
surface and the other limits of body; for the same statement will
apply to them: where the bounding planes of the water were, there in
turn will be those of the air. But when we come to a point we cannot
make a distinction between it and its place. Hence if the place of a
point is not different from the point, no more will that of any of the
others be different, and place will not be something different from
each of them.
(3) What in the world then are we to suppose place to be? If it has
the sort of nature described, it cannot be an element or composed of
elements, whether these be corporeal or incorporeal: for while it has
size, it has not body. But the elements of sensible bodies are bodies,
while nothing that has size results from a combination of intelligible
elements.
(4) Also we may ask: of what in things is space the cause? None of the
four modes of causation can be ascribed to it. It is neither in the
sense of the matter of existents (for nothing is composed of it), nor
as the form and definition of things, nor as end, nor does it move
existents.
(5) Further, too, if it is itself an existent, where will it be?
Zeno's difficulty demands an explanation: for if everything that
exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad