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Moreover, you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term in
its literal meaning, with the implication that it is most fitting so
to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.g. the expression
'strong at heart' will suggest not the courageous man, according to
the use now established, but the man the state of whose heart is
strong; just as also the expression 'of a good hope' may be taken to
mean the man who hopes for good things. Likewise also 'well-starred'
may be taken to mean the man whose star is good, as Xenocrates says
'well-starred is he who has a noble soul'.' For a man's star is his
soul.
Some things occur of necessity, others usually, others however it may
chance; if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur
usually, or if a usual event (or, failing such an event itself, its
contrary) has been stated to occur of necessity, it always gives an
opportunity for attack. For if a necessary event has been asserted to
occur usually, clearly the speaker has denied an attribute to be
universal which is universal, and so has made a mistake: and so he has
if he has declared the usual attribute to be necessary: for then he
declares it to belong universally when it does not so belong. Likewise
also if he has declared the contrary of what is usual to be necessary.
For the contrary of a usual attribute is always a comparatively rare
attribute: e.g. if men are usually bad, they are comparatively seldom
good, so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them to be
good of necessity. The same is true also if he has declared a mere
matter of chance to happen of necessity or usually; for a chance event
happens neither of necessity nor usually. If the thing happens
usually, then even supposing his statement does not distinguish
whether he meant that it happens usually or that it happens
necessarily, it is open to you to discuss it on the assumption that he
meant that it happens necessarily: e.g. if he has stated without any
distinction that disinherited persons are bad, you may assume in
discussing it that he means that they are so necessarily.
Moreover, look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident
of itself, taking it to be a different thing because it has a
different name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and
delight and good cheer: for all these are names of the same thing, to
wit, Pleasure. If then any one says that joyfulness is an accidental
attribute of cheerfulness, he would be declaring it to be an
accidental attribute of itself.
Part 7
Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six ways,
and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety, we must grasp
the subject of contraries, in order that it may help us both in
demolishing and in establishing a view. Well then, that the modes of
conjunction are six is clear: for either (1) each of the contrary
verbs will be conjoined to each of the contrary objects; and this
gives two modes: e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies,
or per contra to do evil to friends and to do good to enemies. Or else
(2) both verbs may be attached to one object; and this too gives two
modes, e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil to friends, or to do
good to enemies and to do evil to enemies. Or (3) a single verb may be
attached to both objects: and this also gives two modes; e.g. to do
good to friends and to do good to enemies, or to do evil to friends
and evil to enemies.
The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute any
contrariety; for the doing of good to friends is not contrary to the
doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and belong to
the same disposition. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to
the doing of good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable and
belong to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is not
generally thought to be the contrary of another, unless the one be an
expression denoting an excess, and the other an expression denoting a
defect: for an excess is generally thought to belong to the class of
objectionable things, and likewise also a defect. But the other four