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cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them, we
should look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. For the
one which is followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or,
if the consequences be evil, that is more desirable which is followed
by the less evil. For though both may be desirable, yet there may
possibly be some unpleasant consequence involved to turn the scale.
Our survey from the point of view of consequences lies in two
directions, for there are prior consequences and later consequences:
e.g. if a man learns, it follows that he was ignorant before and knows
afterwards. As a rule, the later consequence is the better to
consider. You should take, therefore, whichever of the consequences
suits your purpose.
Moreover, a greater number of good things is more desirable than a
smaller, either absolutely or when the one is included in the other,
viz. the smaller number in the greater. An objection may be raised
suppose in some particular case the one is valued for the sake of the
other; for then the two together are not more desirable than the one;
e.g. recovery of health and health, than health alone, inasmuch as we
desire recovery of health for the sake of health. Also it is quite
possible for what is not good, together with what is, to be more
desirable than a greater number of good things, e.g. the combination
of happiness and something else which is not good may be more
desirable than the combination of justice and courage. Also, the same
things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied by
pleasure, and likewise when free from pain than when attended with
pain.
Also, everything is more desirable at the season when it is of greater
consequence; e.g. freedom from pain in old age more than in youth: for
it is of greater consequence in old age. On the same principle also,
prudence is more desirable in old age; for no man chooses the young to
guide him, because he does not expect them to be prudent. With
courage, the converse is the case, for it is in youth that the active
exercise of courage is more imperatively required. Likewise also with
temperance; for the young are more troubled by their passions than are
their elders.
Also, that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or
at most seasons, e.g. justice and temperance rather than courage: for
they are always useful, while courage is only useful at times. Also,
that one of two things which if all possess, we do not need the other
thing, is more desirable than that which all may possess and still we
want the other one as well. Take the case of justice and courage; if
everybody were just, there would be no use for courage, whereas all
might be courageous, and still justice would be of use.
Moreover, judge by the destructions and losses and generations and
acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction is
more objectionable are themselves more desirable. Likewise also with
the losses and contraries of things; for a thing whose loss or whose
contrary is more objectionable is itself more desirable. With the
generations or acquisitions of things the opposite is the case: for
things whose acquisition or generation is more desirable are
themselves also desirable. Another commonplace rule is that what is
nearer to the good is better and more desirable, i.e. what more nearly
resembles the good: thus justice is better than a just man. Also, that
which is more like than another thing to something better than itself,
as e.g. some say that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus because he
was more like Achilles. An objection may be raised to this that it is
not true: for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble Achilles
more nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles the best
of them, and that Odysseus was a good man, though unlike Achilles.
Look also to see whether the resemblance be that of a caricature, like
the resemblance of a monkey to a man, whereas a horse bears none: for
the monkey is not the more handsome creature, despite its nearer
resemblance to a man. Again, in the case of two things, if one is more
like the better thing while another is more like the worse, then that