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the very course of comparing the things together we at once assert
also that each of them, or the one of them, is desirable, e.g.
whenever we call the one good 'by nature' and the other 'not by
nature': for dearly what is good by nature is desirable.
Part 5
The commonplace rules relating to comparative degrees and amounts
ought to be taken in the most general possible form: for when so taken
they are likely to be useful in a larger number of instances. It is
possible to render some of the actual rules given above more universal
by a slight alteration of the expression, e.g. that what by nature
exhibits such and such a quality exhibits that quality in a greater
degree than what exhibits it not by nature. Also, if one thing does,
and another does not, impart such and such a quality to that which
possesses it, or to which it belongs, then whichever does impart it is
of that quality in greater degree than the one which does not impart
it; and if both impart it, then that one exhibits it in a greater
degree which imparts it in a greater degree.
Moreover, if in any character one thing exceeds and another falls
short of the same standard; also, if the one exceeds something which
exceeds a given standard, while the other does not reach that
standard, then clearly the first-named thing exhibits that character
in a greater degree. Moreover, you should judge by means of addition,
and see if A when added to the same thing as B imparts to the whole
such and such a character in a more marked degree than B, or if, when
added to a thing which exhibits that character in a less degree, it
imparts that character to the whole in a greater degree. Likewise,
also, you may judge by means of subtraction: for a thing upon whose
subtraction the remainder exhibits such and such a character in a less
degree, itself exhibits that character in a greater degree. Also,
things exhibit such and such a character in a greater degree if more
free from admixture with their contraries; e.g. that is whiter which
is more free from admixture with black. Moreover, apart from the rules
given above, that has such and such a character in greater degree
which admits in a greater degree of the definition proper to the given
character; e.g. if the definition of 'white' be 'a colour which
pierces the vision', then that is whiter which is in a greater degree
a colour that pierces the vision.
Part 6
If the question be put in a particular and not in a universal form, in
the first place the universal constructive or destructive commonplace
rules that have been given may all be brought into use. For in
demolishing or establishing a thing universally we also show it in
particular: for if it be true of all, it is true also of some, and if
untrue of all, it is untrue of some. Especially handy and of general
application are the commonplace rules that are drawn from the
opposites and co-ordinates and inflexions of a thing: for public
opinion grants alike the claim that if all pleasure be good, then also
all pain is evil, and the claim that if some pleasure be good, then
also some pain is evil. Moreover, if some form of sensation be not a
capacity, then also some form of failure of sensation is not a failure
of capacity. Also, if the object of conception is in some cases an
object of knowledge, then also some form of conceiving is knowledge.
Again, if what is unjust be in some cases good, then also what is just
is in some cases evil; and if what happens justly is in some cases
evil, then also what happens unjustly is in some cases good. Also, if
what is pleasant is in some cases objectionable, then pleasure is in
some cases an objectionable thing. On the same principle, also, if
what is pleasant is in some cases beneficial, then pleasure is in some
cases a beneficial thing. The case is the same also as regards the
things that destroy, and the processes of generation and destruction.
For if anything that destroys pleasure or knowledge be in some cases
good, then we may take it that pleasure or knowledge is in some cases
an evil thing. Likewise, also, if the destruction of knowledge be in
some cases a good thing or its production an evil thing, then